Introduction
Many AI researchers have created ad hoc strategies for rea.
•oning under uncertainty.
They have invariably explained their approaches a.s necessary because of limitations of probability theoryl. 2. Many familiar with probability theory, however, argue that ad hoc methods for dealing with uncertainty are unnecessary and that probabilistic methods are sufficient in all cases3• •· 5• 6•1. In this paper, we will focus on the l\1YCIN certainty factor model1, a purportedly ad hoc method for managing uncertainty that has seen wide use in rule-based expert systems. Shortliffe and Buchanan, creators of the model, justify t. he use of certainty factors by demonstrating system performance equal to that of experts in the field8.
However. since they failed to provide a precise characterization of certainty factors, a good deal of mystery and confusion about the numbers has been generated. In this paper, we will clear up much of this mystery by showing that there are probabilistic interpretations for certainty factors. By demonstrating an equ iva len ce between certainty factors and probabilities we will also lend support to the arguments that probability theory is sufficient for reasoning under uncertainty.
Previous Work
This work is not the first to attempt to gain a better understanding or certainty factors. Adamso demonstrated several problems with the original definition of certainty fa�tors.
In an unpublished internal memo10, Duda, Hart, . This work "'" supported in part by lhe Josiah Maey, Jr. f'ound&lion and lhe examined the algebraic properties of certainty factors without attempt i ng a probabilistic interpretation. The significance of his work within the current context will be discussed.
MYCIN's Certainty Factors
Before examining probabilistic interpretations for MYCIN's certainty factors, we present a simplified overview of the quantities. 1\fYCIN's knowledge is stored as ru/,6. Rules are of the form IF widence THEN hvpothe�Jis. In this paper, rules wiJI be re· presented by
E -----------> H
where H is a hypothesis and E is evidence relating to tbe hypothesis. For example, a hypothesis might be that the organism Slaphvlococrus is infecting a patient while evidence for t-his hypot. hesis might be that the organism is gram-positive and grows in clumps.
In medicine, relat-ionships between evidence and hypotheses are often uncertain. In order to accommodate these non deterministic relationships, MYCIN uses certainty factors. To each rule, a certainty factor is attached which represents the change in belief about a hypothesis given some evidence. In this paper, we write
CF(H. E) E -----------> H
Certainty fa . ctors range between -1 and 1. Positive numbers correspond to an incr,as' In belief in a hypothesis while negative quantities correspond to a dureas' in belief. Note that certainty factors do not correspond to measures of ahsolut' belief.
This has been a source or confusion with 'respect to certainty factors as well as other measures of uncertainty 13 .
In MYCIN, it is possible that several pieces of evidence bear on the same hypothesis. It is also possible for a hypothesis to serve as evidence for another hypothesis. A interconnected set of hypotheses and evidence is called an in/er,net ndwork1 4 . Figure 1 depicts one possible net. In the figure, Si is a statement which serves as either evidence or a hypothesis or sometimes both.
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Figure 1: An inference net Now let us examine the mechanisms used In MYCIN to propagate certainty factors through an inference net. In the certainty factor model. t.he propagation of belief is defined for two elementary inference nets. Propagation through a complex network is accomplished by decomposing the net Into elementary structures where propagation Is straightforward. The first. of these e lementary networks is diagramed below.
Here. two pieces of evidence bear on the same hypothesis. In MYCIN, these two rules are combined into an effective single rule with certainty factor CF(H,E1E2) equal to
\\'e will refer to thill pro>tess as parallel combination.
In the second elementary network, a hypothesis serves as evidence for another hypothesis. Diagrammatically, we have
where E' is certain but E and H may not be certain. These two rules are combined into an effective single rule with a certainty factor denot.ed by CF(H,E') where CF(H,E') = CF(H,E) aax(o, CF(E,E')).
(2)
This will be called sequential combination.
To see how these combination formulas can be used to propagate certainty factors in more complicated situations, consider the following example:
That is, if a person likes to go to parties, then the change In belief that he Is an extrovert is .8. Ir he likes to make solo backparkin� trips, the chan�e in belief that he is an extrovert Is -.5. Furthermore, if a person is an extrovert, then the change in belief that he participates in some type of social work is .4.
To compute the change in belief that a person Is an extrovert given that he likfs to go to parties and also likes t.o make solo backpacking trips, we use the parallel combination function (1) wit. h CF(H,E 1 ) .8 and CF(H,E2) ·.5 g1vmg CF(H,E1E2) = .8-.5 I 1 -.5 = .6 . To compute the change in belief that a person does some type of social work given that he likes to go to parties and also likes to make solo backpacking trips, we use the sequential combination function (2) with CF(E.E') = .6 (the result of parallel combination) and CF(H,E) = .4 giving CF(H,E') = (.6X.4) = . 24. This decompositlonal approach to propagation is straightforward when an Inference net has a tree structure. However, MYCIN's inference net is not a tree and additional ad hoc procedures were introduced to handle complexities such as multiple paths from evidence to hypothesis. To :simplify this discussion, we will only consider tree networks " .
Overview of Interpretation development
As mentioned above, the certainty factor CF(H,E) represents the change In belief of a hypothesis H based on the evidence E. In the original work 1 , the creators of certainty factors presented this basic notion and then immediately proposed a formal definition of certainty factors In terms of probabilities. In somewhat simplified form and In our notation, Shortliffe and Buchanrn gave as thf definition of CF(H,E):
Given this definition, however, they could not derive exact formulae for combining certainty factors (we will give one reason for this difficulty In a later section). Instead, they proposed "approximate" combination functions. They justified these functions by showing that they satisfied certain properties or "desiderata" which are consistent with the basic notion or certainty factors. For example, one or the desiderata is that parallel combination must not depend on the order in which evidence Is ' prestnted. We will examine these properties in detail shortly.
Much of the efforts that have gone Into trying to understand MYCIN's certainty factors have focused on problems with the origina l deflnition 8 • In this paper, we take a different approach; rather tban define certainty factors in terms or probabilities, we define tbem In terms of the desiderata outlined in the original work. That Is, we take the desiderata t.o be the defining a:rioms of certainty factors. We then look for combinations of probabilistic quantities In the spirit or (3) which are consistent with these axioms.
These combinations are probabilistic interpretations for certainty factors defined In this new way. VVe use these Interpretations to gain new insight Into the use of certainty factors to manage uncertainty .
To proceed, It is important to make two distinctions. The 'irst Is the distinction between the combination functions used 'lY MYCIN and t. he desiderata or defining axioms. To highlight rh!s distinction, the symbol ..1 or the phrase "certainty factor" will be used to refer to any quantity which satisfies the new lefinition of certainty factors while t.he term "CF" will refer to rertainty fa. ct.ors that are combined with the MYCIN functions. The symbol .:1 was chosen to emphasize that the quantity represents a belief update.
A second distinction is made between cert. �lnty fartors In gener;d �nd prtic11br prob:<hili'lir 
for enry e which does not entail E. This axiom will be called the modularity axiom. \\'e will see later that it corresponds to the assumption of condit-ional independence.
As mentioned above, the parallel combination or two pieces of 
Another axiom or parallel combination states that 0 is a special certainty factor. 
for all E2.
In other words, 0 Is the Identity element with respect to parallel combination.
The next property of certainty factors we will discuss was not considered a desideratum in the original work. Rather, it was shown to follow from the definition of the MYCIN parallel combination.
\Ve will upgrade this property to an axiom. Informally the axiom states that If ..:l(H,E) corresponds to the increase in belief of H given E, then -..:l(H,E) should correspond to an equal and opposite dureau in belief. Formally,
(9)
That is, every cntainty factor has an inverse with respect to parallel combination and it's inverse is just the certainty factor with opposite sign.
Finall�·. combination of "extreme" certainty factors must be consisten t with the notion that a ..:l(H.E) or 1 corresponds to the rase where E proves H and a ..:l(H.E) or -1 corresponds to the situation where H is disproved by E. is undefined
The last case corresponds to conflicting evidence where E1 proves H while E2 disproves H.
Requirements or a probabilistic interpretation
Intuitively, a probabilist.ic interpretation for certainty factors is a eombination or probabilistic quantities, in the spirit. or (3), which satisfies the defining axioms. In this section, we will formalize this notion.
First. we requ ire that . there is some runction t such that
where p(H!El denotes the conditional probability of H given E, the posterior probab ility or H. and p(H) denotes the probability or H before E Is known, the prior probability.
The only restrictions we place on f here is that it be a smooth function
• .
Later we will see that the axioms or certainty factors place much tight . er restrictions on f. For later discussion, it is useful to state the above requirement with explicit reference to prior
LI (H,E,e) = f(p(H!Ee), p(Hje)).
(12)
In addition to the above basic requirement, a probabilistic lnterpret . ation should be order preserving. In other words, suppose one update Is greater than another. Given the same prior probability, the posterior probability corresponding to the first update should be greater than the posterior corresponding to the second. More formally,
Finally, a probabilist. ic int. erpretation should be consistent with the notion that ..:l(H.E) = 1 when H follows from E and
• Prtei!!f'ly, thr first derivative of r must exist and be eontinuous.
The original interpretation of certainty factors
In this section, we examine the original definition (3) of certalnt. y factors.
Here, we view (3) as a probabilistic int. erpret. at. lon for certainty factors rather than a. definition. To emphasize this we write
There are several problems with this putative Interpretation.
Here. it is shown thai (15) dictates non-commutative parallel combination of eYidence. In other words, this interpretation violates the tommiJt.at.ivity axiom (6). This demonstration will help motiva te the proba. bilistic interpretations presented later.
Consider two pieces or evidence which bear on the same hypothesis.
Suppose p(H) = . 4. If we first. update the probability or H with the positive evidence and then the negative evidence using (15), we get.
However, if we first update with the negative evidence and then the posi tive evidence, we get
So we see that p(H IE+ E-) < > p(HjE-E+ ). In other words, the origin a I int.erpret.at.ion leads to the unappealing result that the beli ef Jl; a hypothesis is dependent on the order In which evidence for the hypothesis is considered.
A probabilistic interpretation
The soune or non-commutativity can be traced to tbe lack of symmtt. ry in .J ori c · From (15) we see that positive evidence is mtasur�d relatin to the distance between 1 and p(H), while negative evidence is measured relative to the distance between 0 and p(H) (see also figure 3 below). In order to avoid this as�·mmetry, it seems reasonable to map p(HjE) and p(H) into thf interval (·oo, oo) . This gives some "elbow room" In which to combine .4's without asymmetries. In fact, the obvious choice for a "certainty factor" In the Infinite space Is simply the distance between the mapped points of the posterior and prior probabilities. In this case, we can combine these certainty factors by adding them. However, there is now the problem that certainty fa�tors in this space range from ·oo to oo. To fix this problem, we map these numbers into the interval (·1, I) with a funct.ion that preserves the .4 properties. This Is shown diagrammatically In figure 2 .
Note that we are explicitly representing prior evidence • for reasons that will become clear shortly. However, this is not necessary given thf modularity axiom or .J 's, ( 4).
Referring to figure 2, th e function F maps the posterior and prior probabilities in the interval (0,1} into ( · oo, oo). Certainty factors in the th is Infinite space, denoted .400, are then constructed by subtracting the mapped posterior from the mapped prior
Finally, the function G maps the .400's into the interva.l (·1, 1). That is, .1(H,E,e) = G{.1""(H,E,e)).
·we cannot choose the functions F and G arbitrarily because the axioms of certainty factors and the requirements for a probabilistic interpr et ation must be respected. Later we will see that there is no freedom in the choice for F. In particular,
There is more freedom in the choice for G however. We will fee that any G which satisfies
will generate a probabilistic Interpretation.
In this section, we will examine the probabilistic Interpretation gen era.ted by (20) It Is easy to show that this choice for G sa.tlsfles (19) .
or, more simply,
As mention ed earlier, we denote a particular probabilistic interprft. ation with a subscript. We also need to subscript the function G since any function satisfying (10) produces a probabilistic Interpretation. There Is no need to subscript .J00 beca. use F is fixed. 
This is also clear from (16). In combination with (17) , this gives
and since e l -l = ln(t<x/1-x)
we get
ft. is straightforward to show that A1 with the combination funrt ion (26) To get a better feel for A1• we can rewrite (22) as 
,ml f(IIJE l In figure 4 , the two functions are plotted for CF(H.E1) = .:11(H.E1) = 0.5. The two curves never differ by more than a few percent. It can e asilY be shown that the two combination functions differ the most when
CF(H,E1)
In this case, CF(H.E 1 E 2 ) approaches -1/2 while A(H.E 1 E 2 )
approaches -l/3.
QI(H.E2l
A l(H.E2l Bayes' theorem for updating the probability of a hypothesis H given prior e\'idence e and new evidence E:
The corresponding formula for the negation of the hypothesis, -H. is
Dividing (28) by (29) we get P(HiEe ) p(EjHe) p(Hie) P(" H(Ee) P(E/.He) p( " H i e )
Now the odds of some event x, denoted O(x), Is just
so that (30) can be written as
p(E/-He) (29) (30) (31) Note that this form or Bayes' theorem was derived without assuming conditional independence of evidence.
Given (16) and (18) 
Substituting (3S) into (37) then gives the parallel combination function for ..:l1, (26) .
Tht'refore, the probablllstic Interpretation ..:l1 for certainty ra�t ors is consistent with Ba.yes' theorem with the assumption or �onditional Independence of evidence on H and Its negation. Later wt will see that the axioms of certainty factors and the requirements or a probabilistic Interpretation for certainty ra�t.ors mandates the conditional Independence ass umption.
Relationship to the likelihood ratio
The quantity p(EJH)/p(EJ-H) Is commonly called the likelihood ratio and written >.(H,E). With this shorthand, we ran write (3 1) as 
(HjE) P(H/E) -P(H) ----------------P(H)(t -P(H/E))
gives the MYCIN pa.ra.llel combination function c:rad/JI.• That Is. there Is a. proba.blllstlc Interpretation for certainty factors which yields the combination function used by MYCIN. We will not dwell on this mapping since we have shown that dlfferencel5 between the ..:l1 and MYCIN parallel combination functions ar� small. Also, the latter mapping Is more difficult to a. naiyze and work with.
Consldtr the followln& set or choices for G.
e xl/ n -1
Gn(•)
= --------xl/n e 
It Is easy to check that each G8 produces a valid probab!llstic
The parallel combination function corresponding to G1 Is given
• {tn[t•..:l8(H. �)/1 -..:l1 (H . �) )}1.
As n approaches infinity, the combination function tends to select the certainty factor with the la.r&est absolute value. 
That is, suppose we ask the expert to imagine th�ot tbe pri or probability of some hypothesis is 1/2. Then we ask him for the posterior probability of the hypothesis given a piece of evidence.
(43) states that t.his task of "starting" at 1/2 and giving a posterior probability is equiYalent to the task of "starting" at 0
and giving a t'erta . inty fact9r In l-1,1]. This is shown diagrammatically in figure 5. It should be mentioned that elidt-ing probabilities Is not a trivial task. Errors of bias are a major problem. For example, people tend to anchor on prior probabilitiesli.S and tend to be consHvative near o and 128 (i.e., when probabilities are near one, the y are underestimated and when probabilities are near zero, they are overestimated). There are techniques for overcoming biases2 5 , 27, 2e, 28 but such a discussion is not appropriate here.
Completeness of the mapping scheme
Earlier, we saw that It Is possible to generate an Infinite number of probabilistic Interpretations for certainty factors with the map F given by (18) and the map G defined by (17) . In t his sfct.ion, we show that this mapping scheme can generate all probabilistic Interpretations.
In other words, given any quantity which satisfies the basic axioms or certainty factors and the axir;>ms of parallel combination as well as the requirements for a probabilistic Interpretation, there Is an F and G whkh g�nera. tes it.
Consider the second half of the mapping scheme, (17) . It turns out that certainty factors. as defined by the axioms, form a mat.hematical structure called a.n ordered commutative �roup. given a quantity wbicb satisfies the axioms of certainty factors, we will be able to find a G such that (17) and (23) are satisfied.
The requirements on choices for G, (19) , follow directly from (44). (45) and (23) together Imply that
f (P (H/ E,E,). p (H)) = f(p (HI E,E:!). p (H/ E,))•f(p (H J EJ} .P (H)).
In other words, we know f satisfies r(x,z) = r(x,y) • r(y,z)
for <>•I A, )' , and z between 0 and I. Since f Is smooth, there is some function ¢ such that
However, it is clear from (16) (16) and (17), can generate all probabilistic
Interpretations.
The assumption of conditional independence ln the appendix. constraints for the function F similar to those for G In the previous section are derived. These constraints are intimately related to the assumption of condit-ional indep�ndence, (36). In fact, Is shown that If the desiderata of parallel combination are to be respected, the only reasonable assumption to make about the dependencies amon� pi�t'es or evidence which bear on a hypothesis is that or conditional independence.
In this section, we examine two important restrictions placed on the use of �ertalnty factors by the assumption of conditional lndependettce.
The first restriction is that certainty ractors cannot be used to manage uncertainty In an Inference net when any set or mutually exclusive a.nd exhaustive hypotheses in the net has more than two elements. To see this, suppose H1, H2, and H3 are mutually exclusive and exhaustive.
A problem arises wh�n we assume that evidence is conditionally Independent on the Hi's and their negation.
For example, .
. In t fortbrominr Ptp � r, we will. s�ow tbat rerttioty fo.oton nn be seoertlized
•n tueh a way that-thf' h11bly restru�t.1ve a.uumption• diseuned iD this 1eet.ion ea.
suppos� �vidence Is conditionally Independent on -H,. That Is,
Now suppose that e1 disproves H2 and e2 disproves H1 . Assuming that evidence is independent given H1 and H2, we get
which is not true in general.
The stcond rtstriction concerns two other types or comb in at ion defined in the certainty factor model. Those familiar wit.h MYCIN may recall that the system uses "fuzzy set operators" to handle conjunctions and disjunctions of PViden�t in a rule prtmise. It Is not very difficult to show that thtse functions violate the assumption or conditional lndtpt'Odt'nce. Therefore, these combinations must be avoided in order to adhere to the desiderata.
Sequential combination
Now Itt us turn our attent.ion to sequential combination. Rtcall, that one hypothesis can serve as evidence for another. Therefore, evidence for a hypothesis may Itself be uncertain. As mentioned earlier, the simplest case can be represented as follows
whtrt' E' is certain and E and H may not be certain. We are interested In constructing the single rule E' ----------> H with certainty factor �(H,E').
\\'hat properties are required of sequential comblna.tlon? t' nfort unately, no desiderata concerning sequential combination were given in the original work so a set of axioms that seem simplt and intuitively appealing are Introduced.
The first three axioms concern the value or �(H,E') when when .l(E.E') takes on the special values -1, 0, and 1. We require that.
if ol(E,E') = 0 then � (H,E') = 0.
(46)
In the first case, E' proves E with certainty, In the second, E' disproves E with certainty and in the third, E' says nothing about E. In the stcond case, It is clear that another certainty factor, .l(H.-E). must. be associated with every IF-THEN rule. That is. it is nerrssary to know the update for H when E is false. From (2) we see that in MYCIN, CF(H,E') is 0 whenever
Thus, MYCIN Is Implicitly assuming CF(H ..... .. . E) = 0 for every rule. We will return to this point shortly.
The fourth axiom states that �(H,E') is a function of only the cert a inty fa<.'tors .l(H.E). �(H.-E) and �(E,E'). Informally, we want the net update to depend only on some combination of the individual rule updates. The final requirement of the sequential combinat.lon function Is that .:l(H,E') Is monotonic with respect to �(E.E').
Before doing a formal derivation, let us consider sequential updating on more Intuitive grounds. Consider the fol lowing expression which follows from the definition or conditional probability.
(47)
In order to satisfy the fourth axiom of sequential propagation, we assume p(HJE,E') � p(Hj E} 1nd p( Hj"E,E ') = p( Hj" E).
This formula Is represented graph ically In figure G.
Fl.ure 8: Sequential updating in terms of absolute probabilities
Before we know E', H and E are at their prior values, p(H) and p(E), respectively. "
The evidence E' then updates the probability of E to p(EjE') which changes the probability or H to p(H IE') (see the arrows In the above figure) . In other words, there is a relationship between the updates .:l(H,E') and
4(E.E').
We now consider the formal deriva.tlon of this relationship.
Inst.ead of generating an expression for �(H,E') for some particular probabilistic Interpretation, it Is convenient to derive a relationship bttween t.be likelihood ratios
(so)
The expression for any particular probabilistic Interpretation can then be computed from the relation
� ( H,E) : G(ln(>.(H,E))).
We begin with two expansions analogous to (48).
Dividing the first equation by the second we &et
Now we can divide both numerator and denominator by p(E'j-E) and use p(EjH) + p(-E!H) = 1 to &et
10 that tho two priors, p(H) and p(E), caD Dot 1M 1pecitt ed illdepeodntly. Thil lod &o problomo ID PROSPECTOR becaue experto wen fo rced to provide prion and oft-en did IO inronsist•ut)y t• .
Instead of nquiriDI eoneisteDt prion, PROSPECTOR arrommodatod tho iaeoarilt .. cill b)' a11D1 a aoa-Ba)'erlau updatinc orbemo.
In this papor, we derive expn11ioa1 nlaliDI probabili&y upliattt and, In doia1 so, avoid tbe10 lacoarilleacieo. 
Next. we use (50) and ( 
-X (H, "E
Combining thesr results with (55) we get the sequential combinat ion function in trrms of >.'s:
\\'e can derive the sequential combination function for the prob� bilist ic interpre tation ..11 by using (53) with G given by (�0). The result is ..11 (H,E') -2 ..11(H,E) ..11 (H,"E) ..11(E,E')
It is easy to show that (57) satisfies the axioms of sequential combination.
The sequential combination function for ..11 is plotted in figure 7 for ..11(H,E) = .9 and ..11(H,-E) = -.05, -.2 5, and -.9 .
MYCIN's sequential combination function Is also plotted for comparison.
The plot reveals considerable disagreement between t-he two functions. When I..11(H,-E)I Is near j.l1(H.E)j, the two functions are close for .ll (E,E') greater than 0 but diverge as .ll (E,E') becomes more negative. Finally, let us consider the differences between the MYCJN and proba bilistic combination functions in the example given earlier In this paper concerning the person who likes parties and solo backpacking trips. From the above discussion, it should be clear that we need to specify a certainty factor for the link "E XTROVERT --------> DO E S SOCIAL WORK Suppose this certainty factor is -.4. In this case, if we know a person likes to go to parties and also likes solo backpacking trips, then the increase in belief that he does social work is ..11 = .2. This is close to CF = .24 calculated earlier. In fact, the difference is due to parallel combination only since the sequential combination functions for CF and ..11 are identical when ..1 1(H.E) = -..11(H,-E) and .ll (E,E') is greater than 0.
However, suppose we only know that a person likes solo backpacking trips. In this case, we get CF = 0 and ..11 = -.2 for the change in belief that he does social work. We see that the MYCIN combination function is ignoring the Information contained in the link pictured above.
Diseussion
Our analysis raises two important questions.
Givw the corre11pondence 6etu.oeen certaint11 factorll and pro6a6ilities, whv uBe eertaintv fa ctoril at all.i Or more preciselv, u·hv retain the di11tinction 6etween eertaintv factorll ond probabilitie&f
One possible answer to this question Is that the concept of certainty factors, or more generally, the concept or a probability update is important with respect to the user-system interaction. For example, the concept of an update can be used to assist in explanation. If a user were interested in knowing why a particular hypothesis was being considered, an expert system could display all evidence relevant to the hypothesis and the updates associated with each piece of evidence. In fact, "weight of evidence," a particular type of update mentioned earlier in this paper, Is used by the GLASGOW DYSPEPSIA expert system In this way to explain its reasoning to the user22.
Updates can also be used for entering data into an expert system.
To illust rat e this, consider an expert system for the diagnosis of liver disease which has in its inference net the node "patient drinks alcohol frequently" with possible values "true" and "false." Suppose the program requests that the physician enter a value for this node. The physician then presumably asks the patient whether or not he drinks frequently. Based on the pat.ient.'s answer and how he answers Jt, the physician may not just want to enter "true" or "false" but express his uncertainty about the status of the node. It seems appropriate for the physician to relay his uncertainty as an update rather than an absolute probability. A simple argument for this can be made when the inference net has a tree structure. First note t.hat In a tree network , prior probabilities for all non-root nodes can be calculated from the prior of the root node. Jn particular, the prior probabilities of the leaf or data nodes are a.
• There is a oimple intuitive expl&nation for &be 1harp eoneavity or the sequential eombination funetion for a1 as .:l(H,-E) approaebel o. This oituation eorresponds to the ease wbue p(H) is near p(HJ-E). ID this oitualion, we oee from firure 8 that p(E) is nnr 0. Sinee E io bichly unlikely, it takes a olroll& posith•e update on E to raise it• probability t.o a value t.bat will alt.er t.be probability of H sicnifieanlly. function of t.he certainty factors or updates assigned to the network by some expert. Therefore, even though a user may agree with some specified prior for the root node, his priors for data nodes may not be consi!tent with those of the system because he may not have the !arne Information th at Is cont.a.ined in the net. Thus, if the physician simply reports an absolute probability for the status of the data node after the pa.t.ient. reports that be does not drink frequently, the resulting updates in the net may be Inaccurate due to the dltrerences between the physician's and sy!tem's prior probability tor the node. A more accurate propatation of uncertaint.y occurs If the physician enttrs an update for the data node which can then be propagated according to the prescriptions or this work. Note that. the physician does not have to calculate an update •jn his head."
He may simply enter both his prior and posterior proba.bilities for the node from which the system can calculate the update.
\\'hv i4 Ml"CIN ao aucceufulf
In this pa pt'r, we discussed several restrictions that a system must satisfy before the use or certainty factors is consistent with the desiderata. However, MYCIN violates some or these re�t rictions. For example, the system contains :sets or mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses with more than two elements. In addition, certa.inty factors were elicited without a dear op nat ional definition. In fact, they were elicited with the not ion that they roughly corresponded to positive predictive value (p(H(E)), an absolute quantity1.
However, the system performs as well as experts In the field.
Perhaps detailed
ronsiderat.lons or uncertainty is not critical to the system's performance. Indeed, a sensitivity analysis or MYCIN's knowledgt> bast' carried out by Cooper and Clancey28 revealed th at the system's performance did not depend strongly on cha.ngt>s in rule certainty factors. It would be interesting to study the performance or a other systems using certainty factor� with resptct to systematic violations of the restrictions outlined In this paper.
Summary and co nclusions
A redefinit ion of certainty factors in terms of the original desiderata has btt>n proposed. Using the definition of G. (17) , and tile restrictions on this function (19) , the second requirement or a probabilistic Interpretation (13) becomes Similarly, the third requirement (14) becomes .4""(H,E) = oo iff (p(H!E) = 1 and p (H) <> 0)
.400 ( H,E) = -oo iff (p(H JE) = 0 and p(H) <> 1) .
These requiremtnts along with the definition of F, (16), give the following restrictions on F:
F aonoton ic increasing F(I) ,; oo F (o) ,; -oo .
\\'e are now ready to examine the relationship between the assumpt.Joo of condit ional independence and further restrictions on the function F. \Ve begin the analysis by showing that If the function F Is givtn by (18}, then all evidence which bears directly on a hypothesis Is conditionally Independent of the hypothesis and Its negation. As we showed earlier, when F is a:iven by (18) , the equations (16) and (31) give .i"" (H, E, e) = l n (p(E.JHe)fp (E j" He)) (ste (33)). Since the function G has an Inverse, we can write the modularity axiom (4) as fo llows:
..:1""(H,E,e) = ..:1""(H,E)
for all e which does not entail E. Using (33) and the fact that the log function has an Inverse, we get P(EJHe) p(EJH)
P(EJ"He) P(Ef"H)
for all • which does not entail E. Note that (58) is almost the requirement or conditional Independence.
Wben we considered sequential combination, we saw that every rule In an Inference net of the form IF E THEN H must be assoclat.ed wlt.h a certainty factor ..:1(H.-E), the change In belief or H given the a61ence of E. as well as a certainty factor ..:1(H,E). Given this, we get the companion requirement or (58)
p("E(He) p("E( H)
---------= --------(59) P ("E i " He) p ( "E j"H) for all • which does not entail -E.
From (58} and (59) It follows that either p(E)He) = p(E ) "He)
for all • which does not entail E or Its negation, or that p(EJHe) = p(EJ H ) and p(EJ"H e ) = p(EJ"H)
for all • which does not entail E or its negation. (60) Implies ..1(H,E) = 0 which means that E has no affect on H. Therefore.
when F Is given by (18) , evidence which has any bearing on a · hypot.htsls must be con ditionally Independent on the hypothesis and Its negation.
